This paper presents a measurement study that analyzes large-scale traffic data gathered from two different wireless scenarios: cellular and WiFi networks.
network features, without using any additional specialized datasets (e.g., geolocation database) or resource-intensive solutions (e.g., DPI boxes to collect HTTP traffic.).
Introduction
The pervasive use of mobile devices such as smartphones to access an array of personal and financial information makes them rich targets for malware writers and attackers. Studies have revealed threats and attacks unique to mobile platforms, such as SMS and phone call interception malwares [1] . The claims about prevalence of mobile malware were recently disputed when Lever et. al [2] showed that mobile malware appears only in a tiny fraction of devices in their dataset: 3492 out of 380 million (0.0009%), concluding that mobile application markets are providing adequate security for mobile device users. However, their work did not provide a comprehensive view of malicious network traffic since their analysis was limited to the threats that issue DNS requests to known malicious domains. Also, they did not quantify the prevalence of specific types of threats affecting the network in their characterization study.
In this paper, we perform a detailed characterization of malicious traffic generated by mobile devices using packet traces and security event logs from a major US-based cellular network. Our analysis reveals that 0.17% of over 2 million devices in the cellular network triggered security alerts. This fraction, while still small, is much higher than the previous infection rate reported in [2] and is in agreement with recent direct infection rate measurements focusing on the Android platform [3] . This alarming infection rate calls for a more careful and thorough study of malicious traffic in the mobile ecosystems.
A second area of our focus deals with the problem of 'detecting' malicious hosts/URLs. Previous studies such as [4, 5] treat this as a supervised learning problem where a classifier learns on a combination of DNS, WHOIS, lexical, and other features associated with a given host to decide whether it is malicious or benign with high accuracy. Other studies such as [6, 7] exclusively 2 utilize lexical features to achieve similar goals. A different approach, Nazca [8] , was proposed recently to detect malware distribution networks by tracking web requests associated with malware downloads and installations.
Instead of focusing on features associated with the malware or hosts (e.g., URLs), we examine features based on network traffic to/from malicious domains/hosts associated with the detected threats in a cellular network. We observed that there are distinctive network access patterns that can be leveraged to distinguish between benign and malicious sites.
We then present an in-depth analysis on the network-level features of malicious domains using a large-scale WiFi traffic dataset from a university campus.
Based on the lessons learned, we design an in-house domain screening technique that can accurately detect malicious domains by mining network traffic. Such a technique can be used by operators to augment their existing security capabilities (such as firewalls, IDS etc.) or to complement other detection methods such as those based on lexical features. Also, the domains screened via our proposed technique can be reported to third-party systems that can further scrutinize them with more advanced techniques and/or specialized auxiliary datasets (e.g., geo-location database).
To summarize, the contributions of our work are three-fold: a) We provide a large-scale characterization of malicious traffic by analyzing traffic records and security alerts of over 2 million devices in a US-based cellular network. In addition to revealing higher infection rate, we show that four classes of threats -privacy-leakage, adware, SIP attacks and trojans -are the most prevalent in mobile devices. Also, we find that 0.39% of Android devices are infected, while the infection rates of BlackBerry and iOS devices which are commonly considered more secure are observed to be comparatively high (0.32% and 0.22% respectively).
b)
We analyze the aggregate network-level features of cellular traffic for malicious and benign domains accessed by user devices. We demonstrate that the network traffic based features are complementary to lexical features 3 and hold promise to add to the capabilities of existing malicious domain detection rules. c) By analyzing over 2.4 TB of WiFi traffic from a university campus network, we perform a comprehensive exploration of a large feature space consisting of over 500 statistical attributes derived from network traffic to/from malicious and benign domains. Using an enhanced feature set and methodology, we design an effective machine-learning classifier that is capable of identifying malicious domains with an accuracy of over 90% utilizing only 20 network traffic features. These results can provide important implications on mobile network operators since they can leverage network traffic to perform effective malicious domain screening without the need for specialized datasets (e.g., geo-location database) or resource-intensive solutions (e.g., DPI boxes to collect HTTP traffic.).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of our datasets and methodology. In Section 3, we present the findings of our characterization study of mobile threats. Sections 4 and 5 investigate how to detect the malicious traffic by exploring their nature of network footprints in a cellular and WiFi networks, respectively. After discussing related work in Section 6, we conclude the paper in Section 7.
Data Summary & Methodology
We utilize datasets obtained from two different operational wireless network environments for our analyses: (a) A US based cellular carrier network environment and (b) A large university campus WiFi network. We now describe each of these datasets in more detail.
Cellular Network Data
This dataset, collected at a distribution site operated by a US cellular service provider, is multiple terabytes in size and logs HTTP activities of over two million subscribers for a week-long period in summer 2013. What makes the dataset more interesting is the associated security alert logs generated by commercial systems deployed in the network.
Specifically, the following traces are contained in our dataset:
• Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) Records: These records log HTTP activity of subscribers in the network and contain flow level information associated with each HTTP request, such as, the timestamp, duration, bytes transmitted in each direction, source IP address, URL, and User Agent of the flow.
• Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and Anti-Virus (AV) Alert Logs: These logs contain threatname (usually vendor specific), subscriber IP address, timestamp, destination HTTP domain, and destination port of the alerted activity.
• IP Assignment Records: These records map dynamically assigned IP addresses to anonymized subscriber device IDs.
• VirusTotal, McAfee scan results: We performed additional scans on certain domains and IP's in the IDS and AV logs to obtain additional information about the threats and number of malware detection engines flagging it as positive (malicious).
Identifying Cellular Devices and Platforms
The events in our malicious traffic alert database could have been triggered by either mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets or laptops and desktops that connect to the cellular network via hotspots/modem devices. We were provided with the registered make, model and operating system information for about half of the anonymized subscribers in the trace. For the other subscribers, we infer the device type, make, and OS type using the User-Agent fields from their DPI records with the help of an in-house tool 1 We would like to note that the availability of the data from the carrier's network was limited due to its proprietary nature. We also note that we can map traffic records to devices generating them uniquely using anonymized device registration identifiers and NAT (Network Address Translation) logs provided by the carrier.
WiFi Network Data
As noted earlier, in addition to the cellular traffic data, we collect network traces from WiFi controllers that connect and control the WiFi Access Points (APs) at a large university campus. The controllers connect the APs to the campus backbone network allowing the wireless devices (laptops, smartphones, tablets etc.) to access Internet. The network traces were collected from controllers dedicated for different locations such as residential dormitories, offices, classrooms, cafeterias etc. We collect over 2.4 TB of packet captures generated by 27,292 distinct WiFi users over a three days period from nearly 1,000 campus APs in April 2014. Table 1 provides a summary of the network capture data we use in our analysis. Also, we obtain an auxiliary set of network session logs:
each entry in a session log represents a user session with information about the user-name, device MAC address, IP address, and WiFi session start and end times.
Note that all the network traffic traces and logs are anonymized and any personally identifiable information are removed. We have anonymized the IP (e) Known malicious behavior. Eg. Attempt to trigger a DDoS, replay attack, etc.
AV-1
Known malware detected on a device through a signature. we use a prefix-preserving anonymization as proposed in [9] . We also note that there is no impact of NAT on our study since we can uniquely identify each device connecting to the network with the anonymized session log.
Building Ground Truth for Malicious Traffic
We now discuss how we generate the ground truth for malicious traffic in cellular and WiFi datasets.
Cellular Network Malicious Traffic
As mentioned earlier, the cellular carrier deploys two separate commercial IDS's in its premises. Each IDS passively monitors different characteristics of traffic and flags security events without initiating any 'block' actions. We utilize logs produced by these appliances in our characterization study. We also use records logged at AV scanners deployed at select end-client devices as an additional auxiliary source of security evidence. Figure 1 presents the web categories of domains in the "known malicious" set. We also form a set of 20,000 "known benign" domains chosen from the samples with zero detections from VirusTotal.
We use these labeled data along with the WiFi network traces and the auxiliary network logs for our supervised classification experiment.
Characterizing Mobile Threats

Prevalence of Malicious Traffic in the Cellular Network
Unlike Lever et. al [2] we do not limit our characterization study to HTTP/ HTTPS traffic generating DNS requests to malicious domains. The security systems in the cellular network in addition to observing web and DNS traffic, also monitor security events generated by VoIP traffic (running over the SIP protocol on ports 5060, 5061) and a number of non-standard ports used by known malware/trojans (eg. Ports 22292, 21810 used by the ZeroAccess Trojan
[11], Port 7776 used by Backdoor.Remocy Trojan [12] , Port 8080 used by worms such as MyDoom [13] ).
A total of 7849 out of 3.38 million uniquely identifiable devices were observed to trigger security alerts in our combined alert datasets. 73.2% of these events originated from a mobile device such as a smartphone or tablet while the rest are triggered by devices behind a wireless hotspot, and hence cannot be uniquely identified as being mobile or non-mobile. This puts the lower bound of the overall infection rate of mobile devices at 0.17% (5751 out of 3.29 million mobile devices), which is orders of magnitude higher than those reported in the most recent work by Lever et al [2] . Also, our observed infection rate is in agreement 9 with the reported rate in a recent study focusing on Android malware infection rates [3] .
We rank the infected devices based on the total number of security alerts generated over the course of the week, and found that the top 20% of the devices account for more than 80% of the security alerts. Interestingly, the top 20% of the infected devices primarily consisted of Android and iOS based phones/tablets. Next, we investigate the nature of security threats that trigger these alerts. The x-axis in this graph represents the top n% of threats in terms of the total number of alerts generated. In general, a small fraction of threats (5-15%)
are responsible for a major proportion (over 80%) of the observed alert traffic.
However, we note that mobile threats in general tend to generate less number of alerts than their non-mobile counterparts. This might indicate that attackers have adapted mobile malware to be stealthier and harder to detect on the network. Moreover, some mobile-specific threats (e.g., privacy leakage) generate less network footprints and hence trigger less number of alerts.
Exploring this further, we see that the number of alerts observed to be generated per threat is a function of the threat family (e.g. botnet, data leakage, etc.) and the number of devices affected by the threat. Privacy leakage threats such as threats responsible for leaking IMEI or location information from a device generally do not generate as many alerts as devices affected by a botnet threat (as shown in Figure 2b ). A 'zombie' bot device makes regular call-backs to command and control servers for downloading instructions, data exfiltration and so on, hence generating a much larger footprint in the security alert logs. This implies that mining alert logs generated by network access activities could be effective in early detection and prevention of botnet-like threats. However, similar methodology will be ineffective for other threats, such as data leakage, that leave very little footprints. We incidentally observe that three botnet threats ( 1% of all observed threats) generated 49.3% of the observed alerts in the data. Table 3 . We now describe the characteristics of each of these malware categories and how they affect end users:
Trojan Threats: These programs deliberately cause harm to a user device while posing to be a benign application such as a free anti-virus solution. The harm can be either in terms of allowing unauthorized remote access to the device, hijacking device resources, turning the device into a bot/proxy, stealing user information etc. This class of malware is observed to be the most effective form of threat currently affecting mobile devices. Interestingly, through the course of our analysis, we detected instances of the Zeus trojan affecting 82 distinct iOS based mobile devices in the network. Although mobile variants of this threat affecting other platforms such as Windows Mobile and Android have been seen in the wild, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first time a variant of this threat was identified affecting iOS devices [14] . Unfortunately, we were not able to explore characteristics of this malware further due to limitations in the dataset.
Privacy Leakage Threats: Threats which maliciously leak the IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity) number and device location information affect over 1200 unique mobile devices, making this one of the most successful attacks targeting mobile devices. Although traditional desktop malware which leak sensitive user data exist, this problem is more pronounced in the mobile ecosystem. This may be due to the sensitive nature of data stored on user-13 devices which attackers deem valuable, issues of application over-privilege in some mobile platforms, and the availability of third party app stores which makes deploying such malicious applications easy to do. Table 4 presents the breakdown of the various types of privacy leakage issues observable in our ground truth data. Clearly, information such as those presented above would potentially allow an attacker to uniquely observe a targeted user and his activities, making this a serious violation user privacy.
Adware & Potentially Unwanted Applications (PUA): This class of applications sneak into a device deceptively and get installed in such a way that it can be difficult to detect and remove. The primary motive of these programs is to display unwanted advertisements to users, often in the form of pop-up ads.
While some of these apps may just be a minor irritant to the user, they may, in some cases, also act as dangerous spyware that monitor user behavior and collect data without consent.
SIP Threats: The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is widely used for controlling multimedia communication sessions such as VoIP calls over the internet.
Our results indicate that vulnerabilities in this protocol is seen to be a popular target for attackers seeking to exploit mobile devices. These are alarming trends since such vulnerabilities can potentially give attackers the ability to listen-in on confidential voice communications or launch denial of service attacks as reported in previous studies [15, 16] .
Infection rates of popular mobile platforms
The question of which mobile platforms are most vulnerable to security threats has been a hot topic of debate for several years. We attempt to answer this question by utilizing ground truth data obtained from the operational cellular network. by the most recent independent study of malware infection rates in Android by Truong et al [3] who measure it to be in the range of 0.26-0.28% and three times the rate reported by Google [17] .
Android is followed closely by Blackberry with an infection rate of 0.32% (9 out of 2,739 devices) and iOS with 0.22% (3055 out of 1,336,853 devices). These figures show that the walled garden approach / security through obscurity as employed by these platforms are failing to ensure against malware spread. Blackberry devices are often used for business purposes due to their security capabilities. However, the nature of data stored on these devices may induce attackers specifically target this platform which can explain its high infection rate. Attackers are however failing to affect a large proportion of users with devices running Windows based mobile platforms as noted by recent industry reports [18] .
Network Footprints of Cellular Threats
In this section, we investigate if network access patterns associated with malicious domains/hosts contacted by infected user devices exhibit distinct statistical features when compared to accesses to their benign counterparts.
There are many existing studies that target accurate detection of malicious domains/URL's by using different methodologies. Some of these studies utilize a combination of DNS and WHOIS features, host based features, content of the webpage, etc in order to achieve their goals [4, 5] while some other studies such as [6] and [7] exclusively use lexical features. The motivation of our experiments with cellular network traffic however is to investigate if statistical network features can complement existing detection rules such as the lexical features. This methodology can be helpful in situations where other data such as WHOIS, webpage content etc. which are useful for the malicious domain classification task is infeasible to obtain or is otherwise unavailable.
Feature Extraction and Selection
In order to perform our classification experiment, we first build a set of known malicious domains using information from the ground truth alert database.
We then create a set of benign domains by randomly choosing domains visited by subscriber devices which are otherwise not listed in the ground truth database.
We further verify they are benign by running the domains through commercial URL scanners. For these set of known malicious and benign domains, we extract lexical and statistical network features as follows: lexical features for use in detecting malicious URL's in previous studies such as [7] , [4] . We start our analysis by identifying specific network and lexical features that contribute towards distinguishing between malicious and benign hosts. In order to select such features, we utilize the raw set of attributes described above and apply the Chi-squared statistic evaluation [19] . The Chi-squared score essentially measures the difference between the conditional distributions of a network On the basis of the results of this exercise, we narrow down our feature set to 53 distinct attributes associated with each malicious/benign domain after removing attributes which have a score of zero. This reduced feature set includes 10 statistical network features and 43 distinct lexical features. We note that we also experimented with other feature selection methods such as those based on information gain and subset based feature selection [20] , but, obtained the best classification results with features selected using the Chi-squared statistic score. Figure 4 shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of six selected network features associated with malicious and the benign hosts that exhibited the highest chi-squared scores. It is visually apparent that there is significant difference between the conditional distribution for malicious vs. benign domains/hosts for these network features. Other network features which were selected but not shown include the connection entropy, the destination IP entropy and the downlink tonnage.
Classification of Malicious/Benign Domains
Many of the statistical network features we have considered have complex non-linear relationships. This makes the task of classification of domains/hosts into malicious and benign categories non-trivial. To tackle this problem, we Minimum, maximum and average over each http-header feature described above aggregated at the PDA/PUA level. 
Screening Malicious Domains by Mining Network Traffic
In this section, inspired by the analysis above, we perform a deeper exploration of the utility of network traffic-based features in identifying malicious domains. As mentioned before, due to limited availability of the cellular network data, we utilize a large-scale dataset obstained from a campus WiFi network for this purpose. The goal of this exploration is to design an in-house traffic screening technique that can accurately identify potentially malicious domains.
To this end, we classify a given FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name) as being either malicious or benign by mining of network traffic characteristics at three aggregation levels: device-level, user-level, and network-wide. For each aggregation level, we explore possible information available through network traffic and HTTP headers, which will be detailed in the following subsections.
Supervised Learning and Classification
To detect whether a domain is malicious or not, we perform a supervised learning based classification using statistical features of network and HTTPheader information extracted from the secondary set of WiFi traffic traces.
We build a classification model as before using the Random Forest ensemble learning algorithm [21] , and apply SMOTE (Synthetic Minority Over-sampling TEchnique) [22] to deal with the class-imbalance issue. SMOTE allows us to learn with a combination of under-sampled instances from the majority class (i.e. benign domains in our case) and over-sampled instances from the minority class (i.e. malicious domains in our case) and helps deal with the classical problem of the model overfitting to the majority class instances.
Feature Exploration
We conjecture that malicious and benign domains show different characteristics due to differences in terms of (i) popularity (e.g. number of connections),
(ii) access patterns of clients (e.g. uplink tonnage values or source IP entropy), and (iii) response patterns of domains (e.g. downlink tonnage.). We illustrate and explain the intuition behind choosing these characteristics in greater detail by considering representative features in Section 5.2.
In addition to the network features, we consider HTTP-header information that may capture the differences between malicious and benign domains in terms of (i) HTTP conversation characteristics between users and domains (e.g. average length of the request URI, user agent entropy, HTTP referer length etc.) and (ii) Content metadata, e.g. we can infer whether the payload is a binary executable file (which is often likely to be malicious) with the content-type field. Table 7 provides a summary view of these network and HTTP-header features.
Note that exploring the above features in a large-scale network trace whose size is over 2.4 TB is computationally expensive. To address this problem, we use the Spark 2 cluster computing framework [24] in four server machines that consist of a total of 88 CPU cores.
Feature Aggregation Dimensions
We suggest and discuss three different traffic aggregation levels over which the network and HTTP statistical features described above are extracted:
The GNA (also referred to as the network-wide aggregate) captures characteristics of the overall status of network traffic to and from a given domain. For instance, the count of the total number of connections to a given domain is an example of a GNA feature. For attributes that cannot be captured by a single numerical value such as those involving destination ports of domains, HTTP headers or Request URI Length values, we introduce a simple set of statistical measures S as our feature subset:
S :=< min., max., avg., std.dev., var., entropy, median, 25th%ile, 75th%ile,
count of unique values >
Note that if a field from the HTTP-header is not a numerical value, e.g. strings in the 'content-type' field in the HTTP-header, we use the length of the strings of the given field to calculate S.
As an representative example feature obtained via GNA, Figure 6a shows the CDF of destination IP entropies of malicious and benign domains. Entropy is often used to capture the degree of dispersal or concentration of a distribution.
We compute the entropy with a process similar to one described in [25] . We build an empirical histogram X = {n i , i = 1, ..., N }, where flows to destination IP i occurs n i times. Then, the destination IP entropy of a given domain is defined as:
Here S = N i=1 n i is the total number of observations in the histogram. We observe in Figure 6a that the malicious domains tend to have higher entropy values than the benign domains. This is consistent with the attacker behavior of associating multiple IP addresses with a given domain and fluxing between these addresses to avoid IP blacklisting attempts [26] . We note that many domains have only 1-2 IP's associated with them resulting in low entropy values (≤1).
Specifically, around 50% of malicious domains and 60% of benign domains only have a single IP address associated with them leading them to have a destination IP entropy of zero. We also show the distribution of another example feature, 25th %ile of the request URI length, obtained by GNA in Figure 6b . As shown in Figure 6b , the benign domains tend to show higher values of this attribute than the malicious domains. For example, the URI of a benign domain play.google.com/store/-apps/details?id=air.com.insomniacgames.release.f3.omo is sufficiently verbose and informative to the users to guess that the request is related to a game application. On the other hand, the URI of a malicious domain www.962.net/wz/-63863.html is much shorter than the benign URI in length, which can hide what the request leads to. Similar obfuscation effects and their security implications have been studied by recent work such as [27] in the light of URL shorten-ing services. We note however that the dataset we consider does not have many shortened URL's. We also note that the length of the URI of a malicious domain can sometimes be abnormally long. We capture this characteristic in separate attribute which is the Max. Request URI Length.
(ii) Per-device aggregate (PDA): The PDA captures characteristics of network and HTTP features for each device that has accessed a given domain. between the benign domains and users (e.g. checking social network feeds). Figure 7b shows the CDF of average uplink tonnage for malicious and benign domains. We find that malicious domains tend to have lesser uplink traffic to them than benign domains, which is due to the fact that there are a lot more uplink interactions between benign domains and users, e.g. uploading video, sharing files etc.
(iii) Per-user aggregate (PUA): The PUA computes the feature based on user-level aggregation. In our dataset, we find that there exist many users who use more than one device (smartphone, laptop, tablet). Hence, aggregating along the devices of a user might reveal user-specific characteristics of accessing malicious domains. Figure 8a , as an example network feature, shows the CDF of the average source IP connection entropy values. We find that malicious traffic tends to show higher values for this network attribute in our trace. This can be explained by the observation that malware sometimes spoof source IP's before performing malicious actions (e.g. click fraud) to avoid detection or imitate legitimate user traffic. Next, we consider the CDF of a HTTP-header attribute:
the average response count where the HTTP-cache control field set to 'no cache' or 'max-age=0' in Figure 8b . Attackers may want to force connecting clients to reload content from the malicious server and not use cached browser content by setting the HTTP-cache control field to 'no cache' or 'max-age=0'. Accordingly, we observe that the values of this attribute tend to be slightly higher in the case of malicious domains compared to benign domains. 
Feature Selection
We explore a large feature space of over 500 features in different aggregation dimensions (i.e. GNA, PDA, and PUA) and different information sources (i.e.
network and HTTP-headers). However, considering all of these attributes would make the feature extraction process significantly computationally expensive, and in addition, many of these attributes may not contribute positively towards detection of malicious domains. To identify the features that contribute most effectively toward differentiating malicious and benign domains, we use the Chisquared statistic evaluation [19] . We prune our initial feature space by excluding features with Chi-squared scores of zero, and use the resultant reduced feature set (<10% of all extracted features) to build our classifiers. In this section, we report the performance of our supervised classification in terms of the following four well-known metrics: (a) Accuracy, (b) True Positive Rate (TPR) and False Positive Rate (FPR) [28] , (c) F-score / F-measure (F) [29] , and (d) ROC area [30] . We evaluate our models by performing 10-fold cross validation. 
Classifier Evaluation
Network vs. HTTP-header
We build two separate machine learning classifiers for network and HTTPheader features. Table 8 compares the performance of the two classifiers along with a third classifier "Overall" which is built using both the network and HTTP features together. We report the results under the GNA aggregation as it can be easily calculated and obtained by most network operators (since IP to device and device to user mappings are not required for GNA). As shown in Table 8 , the classifier based on network features outperforms the classifier based on HTTP-features (ROC area: 0.94 vs. 0.898). This can have important implications for network operators as network traffic information is often more easily obtainable than HTTP information which requires specialized DPI boxes for data collection. We also observe that some of the HTTP-header features introduce noise to the detection, which results in lower performance in terms of the ROC area when we utilize the HTTP-header features along with the network features.
Impact of Aggregation Levels
Next, we investigate if finer aggregation granularity of network traffic information (i.e. PUA or PDA aggregations) could improve the accuracy of detecting malicious domains. the performance of the classifier to 90.03%. We also observe from Table 9 that the performance of user-level aggregation is worse than the other aggregation dimensions. This is because users in our network traces utilize multiple devices (smartphones, laptops, tablets) belonging to different platforms (e.g. Android, iOS, Windows). As shown in [31] , these platforms have different infection rates and hence we observe that aggregating along devices with different infection rates does not strongly contribute towards detecting malicious domains.
Analyzing Misclassifications
We now analyze the domains that are misclassified by our best performing classifier built using network features under global and device-level aggregation (i.e. the last row of These results suggest that a lightweight pre-processing step for checking domain response codes can help to reduce the false positive rates.
Furthermore, we find that 33.3% of the phishing domains were reported as false negatives (i.e. malicious domains reported as benign). We believe the high false negative rate of the phishing domains is due to the fact that phishing domains masquerade as benign domains and mimic their behavior. This makes it difficult to distinguish the network features of malicious phishing pages and benign domains, resulting in higher misclassification rate. We however note that phishing domains only constitute 5% of all malicious domains in our data. We leave a more detailed analysis of this issue to our future work.
Related Work
There have been significant efforts in recent years towards understanding the characteristics of mobile malware. One class of research in such efforts has focused on characterizing the nature of mobile applications available in official and third party mobile application markets. Zhou et al [32] characterized android malware and performed an evolution-based study on representative threats. In [33] , the authors examined a broad range of security concerns that can affect applications on the Android platform. Egele et al [34] studied privacy threats affecting iOS users whereas TaintDroid [35] used a system wide taint tracking to identify privacy leaks in Android applications. Some studies have surveyed the types of mobile malware seen in the wild, and evaluated different techniques that can be leveraged in detecting and preventing such threats [36, 37, 38] .
Although these studies have provided good insights on the 'inner workings' of mobile malwares, the vulnerabilities affecting smartphone platforms, and the security issues that application markets have to deal with, little has been known about ( Recent commercial reports and press articles covering mobile threats have reported different infection rates of mobile devices. For instance, Alcatel-Lucent's recent report [39] showed that >0.5% of mobile devices are infected by malware whereas McAfee [40] reported a much higher infection rate (>5%). Independent academic studies are therefore important to clarify these measurements to comprehensively understand the current threat landscape. Lever et al [2] took a first step to address such issues by performing a network level analysis on mobile malware using DNS traffic data from a major US based cellular carrier.
However, their analysis is limited only to HTTP/HTTPS based threats which issue DNS requests prior to communicating with malicious URL's. Also, they did not quantify the prevalence of specific types of threats affecting the network and track their temporal growth behavior. Truong et al [3] performed a measurement on the infection rate in the Android platform (as of 2013). They estimated that between 0.26% to 0.28% of Android devices are infected, by means of direct measurements from 55,000 devices. They also pointed out concerns about disparities in commercial vendor reports about mobile malware in their study. They did not, however, perform a detailed characterization of the most prominent families of threats affecting Android or compare infection rates of Android against other popular mobile platforms such as iOS, BlackBerry, and
Windows.
Another set of research efforts relevant to our work has dealt with the prob-31 lem of 'detecting' malicious hosts/URLs. Some studies such as [4, 5] cast this as a supervised learning problem where a classifier learns on a combination of DNS, WHOIS, lexical, and other features associated with a given host to decide whether it is malicious or benign. Other studies such as [6, 7] exclusively utilized lexical features to achieve similar goals. Angiulli et al [41] studied an unsupervised intrusion detection technique by mining HTTP information using the n-gram model. Lakhina et al in [25] and [42] focused on the problem of diagnosing network anomalies (eg. port scans, volume anomalies etc.) based on network measurements. However, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that comprehensively examines network-level features of malicious domains associated with the threats in wireless data networks, and the application of such statistical network features to the malicious domain identification problem, in these networks.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we presented a study of malicious mobile traffic by using data obtained from a major US based cellular carrier and a large campus WiFi network. Our investigation revealed that 0.17% of mobile devices connecting to the cellular carrier are affected by security threats. This infection rate while still small, is much higher than the last reported infection rate of 0.0009% making this a worrisome problem. We combined multiple disparate data sets to uncover details about the threats affecting mobile devices in the cellular network and their unique characteristics. We also performed a detailed analysis of infection rates in various popular mobile platforms. Our results showed that platforms deemed to be more secure by common opinion as iOS and BlackBerry are not as secure as we think. However, Android still remains the most affected platform with an infection rate of 0.39%. We characterized the aggregate network footprint of malicious and benign domains associated with the threats observed in the cellular network dataset, and showed that network features are complementary to lexical features.
Using the over 2.4 TB of WiFi traffic from a university campus network, we next presented a novel, in-house traffic screening technique that can identify malicious domains based solely on statistical properties of network traffic. We demonstrated that our malicious domain classier can achieve over 90% accuracy and 0.959 ROC area.
Our ongoing work includes the exploration of practical system design issues (E.g. finding the optimal training time for the classifier), investigation of finegrained characteristics of different threat categories (e.g. domains generated by Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) [43] , phishing etc.) in terms of network traffic patterns, and exploration of different possible ways of evasion by an adversary. Another important direction is to develop a method for detecting malicious domains when they use encrypted channels for communications (i.e.
HTTPS) using network traffic features. Methods which use HTTP header data for detection are not applicable when the captured HTTP conversation is encrypted, but if a distinguishing network-level signature for encrypted malicious domains exists, it may be useful for identifying such sophisticated malicious domains.
